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INTRODUCTION 
President Obama’s statement, made at a naturalization ceremony 
for members of the armed forces, highlights the current conflict between 
the nation’s immigration law and reality as reflected by the roughly 10.8 
million individuals who currently reside in the United States without 
proper authorization.
1
 Despite a long line of cases suggesting that 
immigration is an executive and congressional concern, contemporary 
frustration with the federal government’s repeated failure to overhaul 
the troubled immigration system has prompted states to enact their own 
immigration regulations.
2
  These efforts peaked in 2011, when 
legislatures in all fifty states considered a total of 1,607 immigration-
related bills and resolutions.
3
 
Encouraged by Arizona’s enactment of the “Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” in 2010, state legislators 
across the country embarked on a quest to decrease the number of 
undocumented immigrants present in the United States. A survey of 
state immigration statutes enacted in 2011 reveals that state legislators 
have sought to bring the reality of extralegal migration in line with the 
mandate of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
through a variety of tactics.  Such enforcement efforts include imposing 
state penalties on employers who fail to verify employment eligibility, 
requiring law enforcement officers conducting a lawful stop to 
determine the individual’s immigration status, prohibiting the harboring 
of undocumented aliens, and making an alien’s failure to carry a 
 
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks at Naturalization Ceremony for Active-Duty 
Service Members (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-naturalization-ceremony-active-duty-service-members; ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES JANUARY 2010, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf. 
2 State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/immig/2007Immigrationfinal.pdf. 
3 Id. 
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registration document a state offense.
4
 
Proponents of the above enforcement tactics, such as Kansas 
Secretary of State Kris Kobach and former Massachusetts Governor 
Mitt Romney, argue that statutes which restrict the ability of 
undocumented immigrants to work, drive, receive charity, and associate 
with United States citizens and authorized immigrants will encourage 
immigrants to “self-deport,” thereby reducing the number of 
undocumented immigrants living in the United States.
5
 It is uncertain 
whether state legislation that seeks to enforce federal immigration 
policy will successfully discourage individuals from entering the United 
States in violation of the law.
6
 In the short term, however, it is troubling 
to consider the devastation that “self-deportation,” effected by state-
based, anti-immigrant legislation, will wreak on the agricultural sector 
of our economy. Although current estimates suggest that slightly over 
16 percent of the nation’s total workforce is undocumented, such 
individuals represent between 50 and 70 percent of all agricultural 
laborers in the United States. 
7
 The agricultural industry is therefore 
dependent on undocumented laborers.
8
 State-based efforts to restrain 
unlawful immigration that do not account for agriculture’s reliance on 
undocumented immigrants threaten to cripple the industry. 
 
4 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan.1-Dec.7, 2011), 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx. 
5 Julia Preston, Romney’s Plan for ‘Self Deportation’ Has Conservative Support, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/romneys-plan-for-
self-deportation-has-conservative-support. 
6 See generally María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the 
United States Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and 
Comparison with Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 301 (2005) 
(Undocumented workers “occupy a key place in the U.S. economy”); Rob Paral, Essential 
Workers: Immigrants are a Needed Supplement to the Native-Born Labor Force, IMMIGR. 
POL’Y CENTER  (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-
reports/essential-workers-immigrants-are-needed-supplement-native-born-labor-force. 
7 Jeanne Batalova & Alicia Lee, Frequently Raised Statistics on Immigration and 
Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=886; The American 
Specialty Agriculture Act: Hearing on H.R. 2847 Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary 
and the S. Comm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony 
of Robert A. Williams). Robert A. Williams is the Director of Florida Legal Services’ 
Migrant Farmworker Justice Project. 
8 Id.; see also Aaron Smith, Farm Workers: Take Our Jobs, Please!, CNNMONEY (July 
10, 2010, 1:14 PM ET), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/07/news/economy/farm_worker_jobs/index.htm. 
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This Note explores the policies and economic developments that 
have led to the agricultural sector’s reliance on unauthorized labor and 
highlights the drastic consequences that will result from legislation that 
attempts a rapid, wholesale removal of unauthorized laborers from the 
nation’s fields without providing a viable alternative. This Note argues 
that anti-immigrant enforcement legislation is not the solution to the 
“problem” posed by unauthorized immigration.
9
 Rather, an effective 
immigration policy must ensure that agriculturalists have access to an 
adequate number of experienced, efficient laborers, and that the rights 
of those individuals are protected. 
This Note proceeds in five stages. Part I traces the historical 
background of immigration policy in the United States. This Part 
remarks upon the traditional rule that the federal government, and not 
the states, is responsible for regulating immigration policy and discusses 
the failure of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act to reverse 
burgeoning extralegal immigration. Part II considers the agricultural 
sector’s reliance on undocumented immigrants.  Part III discusses the 
relationship between state legislatures and immigration policy, with a 
focus on the factors that have spurred current efforts to re-craft 
immigration policy at the state level. Part IV argues that state-based 
immigration enforcement legislation threatens to undermine the vitality 
of the U.S. agricultural industry by effecting the wholesale removal of 
farm laborers without providing for a viable alternative source of labor.  
This Note concludes in Part V by suggesting that immigration policy 
should remain in the hands of the federal government, and argues for 
the adoption of comprehensive legislation to ensure the continued 
existence of an adequate number of agricultural workers while 
comprehensive immigration reform is brought to life. 
 
 
 
9 Carter Yang, White House Weighs Legalization of Mexicans, ABC NEWS (July 16, 
2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=121486&page=1#.T1Pkd4euduM. George 
Bush, speaking at a naturalization ceremony on Ellis Island on July 10, 2001, said 
“immigration is not a problem to be solved. It is a sign of a confident and successful 
nation.” Id. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine: Immigration as a Federal 
Concern 
Early in the nation’s history, state and local governments were 
responsible for passing legislation regulating the “transborder 
movement of persons.”
10
 An underlying theme of early state-based 
immigration legislation was the exclusion of undesirables, such as 
convicts and the poor.
11
 Immediately following the Revolution, the 
Congress of the Confederation recommended that the states “‘pass 
proper laws for preventing the transportation of convicted male-factors 
from foreign countries into the United States.’”
12
 Several states 
responded to this call.  After the passage of the federal Constitution, 
more states re-enacted and revised such legislation.
13
 In contrast to the 
swift action taken by state governments, the federal government “was 
slow to take action to exclude foreign convicts.”
14
 Congress did not 
respond until 1875, when the first federal statute relating to European 
immigration prohibited the immigration of convicts.
15
 
Since 1889, however, immigration regulation has been considered 
the exclusive province of the federal government. Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the power to control 
immigration, the plenary power doctrine, derived from principles of 
international law and sovereignty, holds that the federal government has 
near total control of immigration law and policy.
16
 In Chae Chin Ping v. 
United States, (“The Chinese Exclusion Case”) the Supreme Court held 
that the federal government has the power to regulate immigration, as 
“jurisdiction over its own territory . . . is an incident of every 
independent nation.”
17
 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field 
stated that the power to control immigration is an important incident of 
national sovereignty, as a government unable to exclude foreigners 
 
10 Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993). 
11 Id. at 1841-59. 
12 Id. at 1842.  
13 Id. at 1843. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1844. 
16 Chae Chin Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604-05, 609 (1889). 
17 Id. at 603. 
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“would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.”
18
  
Three years later, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court stated 
that Congress’ inherent power to regulate immigration was an incident 
of the Constitution’s delegation of foreign affairs to the political 
branches of the government.
19
 As in The Chinese Exclusion Case, the 
Court relied on principles of international law to support the conclusion 
that only the federal government could regulate immigration: 
it is a  maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the 
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, 
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit 
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.
20
 
The supremacy envisioned by the plenary power doctrine permits 
the federal government to regulate the conduct of aliens present in the 
United States.
21
 During World War II, California enacted a statute 
prohibiting the issuance of a fishing license to any “alien Japanese.”
22
 
Later, the statute was amended to read “any person ineligible to 
citizenship,” a category which included Japanese nationals living in the 
United States.
23
 Takahashi, a long-time fisherman who had been a 
resident of California since 1907, brought suit to compel the California 
Fish and Game Commission to issue him a license.
24
 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari “to review this question of importance in the fields of 
federal-state relationships and of constitutionally protected individual 
equality and liberty.”
25
 The Court concluded that 
[t]he Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in 
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the 
period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before 
naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization. 
Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers . . . 
State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance 
or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with 
 
18 Id. at 604. 
19 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
20 Id. 
21 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration. 
26
 
In accordance with the Court’s holding in Takahashi, states are 
prohibited from enacting legislation which seeks to regulate the conduct 
of aliens before naturalization. Although the Court declined to 
specifically limit its holding to lawfully admitted aliens, Takahashi’s 
insistence on the dominance of federal control over all aspects of 
immigration suggests that state efforts to regulate the conduct of any 
class of alien before naturalization would be unconstitutional. 
An alternative justification for federal control of immigration 
policy is the doctrine of field preemption. Field preemption exists when 
Congress has so blatantly manifested an intent to regulate a particular 
matter that, even in the absence of a federal rule on the subject, any state 
regulation thereof is preempted.
27
 The Court has explicitly relied on the 
doctrine of field preemption to strike down state immigration laws. In 
Hines v. Davidowitz, a Pennsylvania law required aliens to pay a fee, 
register with the state, and carry a state-issued registration card at all 
times.
28
 The Supreme Court cited the “supremacy of the national power 
in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over 
immigration, naturalization, and deportation,” and held that 
when the national government by treaty or statute has established 
rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or 
burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of 
the land. No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such 
treaty or statute.
29
 
Citing its concern that state-based immigration policy could hamper the 
uncontested federal power to conduct foreign affairs, the Court stated 
that “[o]ur system of government is such that the interest of the cities, 
counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole 
nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting 
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”
30
 
As states increasingly craft legislation that conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that the federal government regulate the 
conduct of aliens living in the United States, such doctrines have moved 
to the forefront of the debate over the future of U.S. immigration 
 
26 Id. 
27 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992). 
28 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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policy.
31
  The plenary power and field preemption doctrines suggest that 
current state efforts to enact comprehensive immigration schemes 
regulating the conduct and treatment of foreign nationals residing in the 
United States will be struck down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.
32
 
B. Tacit Approval of Unauthorized Immigration during the 
Twentieth Century 
During the twentieth century, the United States “tolerated a high 
degree of illegality and tacitly permitted widespread illegal employment 
in agriculture and other low skilled sectors of the economy.”
33
 Despite 
occasional stringent enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws, 
“chronic and intentional under-enforcement of immigration law [was] 
de facto federal policy for over a century.”
34
 Indeed, in 2008, the 
Department of Homeland Security reported removing less than 3 
percent of all undocumented immigrants in the United States, a figure 
that is smaller than the number of new undocumented immigrants who 
entered the country in any recent year.
35
 
Scholars trace the origins of this policy to the agricultural 
industry’s need for more labor than could be found in the United 
States.
36
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, agriculturalists in the 
Southwest turned to Mexican laborers to fill jobs created by advances in 
agricultural production, including irrigation and the invention of 
 
31 Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419. 
32 This hypothesis is supported by the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the 
immigration quagmire. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Arizona v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). The Court determined that three sections of Arizona’s 
controversial S.B. 1070, enacted in 2010 to address the effects of unlawful immigration, 
were unconstitutional as preempted by federal law.  The Court struck down the statute’s 
imposition of state penalties for failure to carry an alien registration document, criminal 
penalties for violations of IRCA’s mandate that only authorized individuals be employed in 
the United States, and authorization for police officers to arrest any individual on probable 
cause that the individual has committed “any public offense” which makes him or her 
removable from the United States. 
33 Id. 
34 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2049 
(2008). 
35 Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
147, 151 (2010) (“[t]he U.S. government has historically enforced the immigration laws in 
ways that provide employers with a ready-supply of low-wage labor.”).   
36 Motomura, supra note 34, at 2049. 
CEVASCO NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:30 PM 
2012] NATION OF LAWS, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 183 
refrigerated railroad cars.
37
 The federal government made little attempt 
to ensure that such workers had legal status, instead focusing 
enforcement efforts on Chinese immigrants who arrived via Mexico as a 
way of skirting the Chinese Exclusion Act.
38
 The federal government’s 
enforcement efforts during this period reflected great discretion for the 
needs of employers, who appeared to prefer Mexican workers without 
permanent legal status to U.S. citizens.
39
 Such immigrants were 
considered a “flexible, disposable workforce, ready to work when 
needed but, as compared to Europeans, more easily sent home when 
they were not.”
40
 Thus, during the early part of the twentieth century, the 
need for an inexpensive and flexible labor force created a de facto 
policy of lenient immigration enforcement and tolerance for extra-legal 
immigration.
41
  The legacy of that policy endures today. 
C. IRCA: Growing Federal Concern over Unauthorized 
Immigration 
Following the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965, the 
number of authorized and unauthorized immigrants entering the United 
States each year burgeoned.
42
 The Act increased the number of legal 
immigrants allowed to enter the United States each year and eliminated 
racial and ethnic quotas, effectuating a 100 percent increase in the 
annual flow of legal immigrants to the country.
43
 Despite the creation of 
legal avenues of immigration, unauthorized immigration also increased 
during this period: one million unauthorized immigrants were 
apprehended each year between 1960 and 1970, indicating that the 
“prevailing immigration system of the nation. . .[was] being widely 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2050. 
41 Id. at 2051. 
42 Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy: A Critique, TEX. BUS. REV.  56(1), 11 (1982), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=hrpubs&se
i-redir=1#search=%221981%20select%20committee%20immigration%22. 
43 Id.; see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM, THE REGIONAL MIGRATION STUDY GROUP, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 9 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-post-9-
11policy.pdf (“[n]otably, Congress explicitly rejected proposals in the 1950s to make it 
illegal to hire or employ unauthorized immigrants.”). 
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circumvented.”
44
 Recognizing that the rapid increase indicated a need to 
examine the existing immigration system, Congress created the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978.
45
 The 
Commission concluded that unauthorized immigration was a public 
financial burden, and “called for the ‘initiation of strong, new efforts’ to 
control illegal immigration.”
46
 In 1986, Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) in response to concerns 
about escalating immigration. 
47
 IRCA offered two new tools to control 
undocumented immigration. 
i. Civil and Criminal Penalties for Knowing Hire of 
Undocumented Immigrants 
IRCA made it “unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to 
recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien 
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.”
48
 The law established the I-
9 system, under which employers were required to establish a 
prospective worker’s identity and employment eligibility by checking 
one or two documents from a list of acceptable identity documents.
49
 
Employers were required to sign the form, affirming that the documents 
appeared genuine and to belong to the worker.
50
 Employers who violated 
the law were to be subject to civil fines for initial offenses; an employer 
found to engage in a pattern or practice of violations could be fined up 
to $3,000 for each unauthorized alien found to be employed, imprisoned 
for up to six months, or both.
51
 
 
 
 
44 Briggs, supra note 42. 
45 Id. at 11. 
46 Id. at 13. 
47 Kristen McCabe and Doris Meissner, Immigration and the United States: Recession 
Affects Flows, Prospects for Reform, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (January 2010), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=766. 
48 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (West 2012). 
49 See generally Kevin Jernegan, Eligible to Work? Experiments in Verifying Work 
Authorization, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 2 (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/Insight-8-Jernegan.pdf. 
50 See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
The Form I-9 Process in a Nutshell, OFFICE OF BUSINESS LIAISON 5-6 (Oct. 7, 2005), 
http://www.cs.ny.gov/personnelcouncil/pdf/The%20I-
9%20Process%20in%20a%20Nutshell%20USCIS%20Bulletin.pdf. 
51 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (West 2012). 
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IRCA’s prohibition on the employment of undocumented 
immigrants proved ineffective in reducing the number of undocumented 
immigrants in the United States. When IRCA was enacted, there were 
approximately 3.2 million undocumented immigrants in the United 
States.
52
 By 1996, that number had grown to five million; by 2007 (the 
first year in which every state considered immigration legislation), 
between 9.3 and 20 million undocumented immigrants lived in the 
United States.
53
 Despite IRCA’s imposition of criminal penalties on 
those who hired undocumented workers, the employment of such 
laborers remained beneficial for both employers and employees: 
“[e]mployers who disregard the statute can hire workers willing to work 
long hours for low wages on an as-needed basis, and undocumented 
immigrants have the opportunity to receive income that, in many 
situations, far exceeds what they could earn in their home countries.”
54
 
IRCA’s failure was furthered by the ease with which workers could 
obtain false documents, and the fact that employers had an incentive to 
accept such documents, as doing so allowed them to circumvent IRCA’s 
mens rea requirement.
55
 As recognized by the Commission on 
Immigration Reform in its 1994 Report to Congress, IRCA’s collateral 
failure was ethnic discrimination by employers: 5 percent of employers 
admitted refusing to hire job applicants whose appearance or accent led 
the employer to suspect that the individual was unauthorized, and 9 
percent of employers said that because of IRCA they began to hire only 
native born U.S. citizens or refused to hire individuals with temporary 
work eligibility documents.
56
 
ii. Legalization and Guest Worker Programs 
IRCA included two provisions of crucial importance to 
agriculturalists reliant on unauthorized laborers. The legalization or 
amnesty program permitted seasonal agricultural workers (“SAWs”) to 
 
52 Richard A. Johnson, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an Updated 
Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the United 
States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 251 (2007) (citing Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research 
Serv., RS21938, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES SINCE 1986, at 3 
(2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39561.pdf). 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 253. 
55 Id. 
56 U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform, U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring 
Credibility, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1994), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.html. 
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apply for permanent resident status.
57
 Persons who had been SAWs for 
at least 90 days during the 12 month period ending May 1, 1986, were 
eligible for temporary permanent residence status and were permitted to 
apply for legal permanent residence status one or two years later.
58
 
“Seasonal Agricultural Worker” was defined as those who performed 
“field work” relating to “planting, cultural practices, cultivating, 
growing and harvesting of fruits and vegetables of every kind and 
other perishable commodities.” There were extended definitions of 
“field work,” “fruits,” “vegetables,” “critical and unpredictable labor 
demands,” “agricultural lands,” “horticultural specialties,” and “other 
perishable commodities.” There was much controversy and litigation 
over what crops were included.
59
 
In total, 1.3 million undocumented workers applied for the SAW 
program; 997,429 of those workers were eventually approved for 
permanent residency status.
60
 
The second important provision for agriculturalists was IRCA’s 
modification of the existing guest worker program. IRCA divided the 
existing H-2 temporary worker classification into two classes.
61
  H-2A 
visas were available for temporary agricultural workers and H-2B for 
temporary non-agricultural workers.
62
 IRCA’s guest worker program 
proved an ineffective method of creating a legally authorized 
agricultural workforce. Employers wishing to sponsor an agricultural 
worker under the new H-2A program were required to show that the 
work was temporary or seasonal.
63
 “Temporary” was defined as not 
 
57 RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 9:23 (2d. ed. 2011). 
58 8 U.S.C. 1160 (1986). 
59 STEEL, supra note 57. 
60 Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodony, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce 
Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA), 40 DEMOGRAPHY 3, 437,439 (2003); VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., MASS IMMIGRATION 
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 183 (1992); 
see also Rachel L. Swarns, Failed Amnesty Legislation of 1986 Haunts the Current 
Immigration Bills in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2006),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/23/washington/23amnesty.html?pagewanted=all (stating 
“immigration officials approved more than 90 percent of the 1.3 million amnesty 
applications for a specialized program for agricultural workers, even though they had 
identified possible fraud in nearly a third of those applications.”). 
61 LAURA LOCKARD, Toward Safer Fields: Using Awpa’s Working Arrangement 
Provisions to Enforce Health and Safety Regulations Designed to Protect Farmworkers, 28 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507, 545, n. 136 (2004). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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more than one year, although the regulations allowed for an extension 
beyond one year in a case of unforeseen circumstances.
64
  Employers 
were also required to show that there were not “sufficiently able, 
willing, and qualified [United States] workers available” to perform the 
work and that employing a temporary worker would not adversely 
affect the wages or working conditions of similarly-employed U.S. 
citizens or work-authorized immigrants.
65
 
Ultimately, IRCA failed to substantially reduce the number of 
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States and entering the 
country each year.
66
 In 1994, the Commission on Immigration Reform 
called on the federal government to take steps to mitigate the impact of 
unlawful immigration on states and local communities, specifically 
through efforts to reduce illegal entries.
67
 The Commission 
recommended that Congress appropriate more resources for preventing 
illegal entry, as it determined that it was more effective and more cost 
efficient to prevent illegal entries than to deport individuals who entered 
the United States in violation of the law.
68
 
II. AGRICULTURE’S DEPENDENCE ON UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANTS 
Nearly a century of tacit approval of unauthorized immigration has 
resulted in the fact that unauthorized workers now play a critical role in 
the U.S. agricultural industry. The industry is “dependent” on labor 
performed by unauthorized immigrants, as an estimated 50 to 75 percent 
or 1.1 million of all farm workers are undocumented. 
69
 Removing these 
 
64 20 C.F.R. § 655.170 (1986). 
65 20 C.F.R. § 655.100 (1986). 
66 Orrenius and Zavodony, supra note 60, at 434.  “The law may have reduced 
undocumented immigration, particularly in the short run, by making it more difficult for 
undocumented immigrants to cross the border and find work in the United States. However, 
there are several reasons why the law instead might have spurred undocumented 
immigration.” In a study reliant on data on border apprehensions as a “proxy for the number 
of people who illegally entered the United States,” researchers found that “IRCA failed to 
discourage undocumented immigration in the long run.” Id. at 448. 
67 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING 
CREDIBILITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1994), http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.html. 
The Commission also noted that the federal government has a responsibility to mitigate the 
impacts of unlawful immigration on states and localities, particularly through renewed 
efforts to reduce illegal entries.  Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Testimony of Robert A. Williams, supra note 7 at 84.; see also Jesse McKinley and 
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workers from the national economic equation without creating a new 
source of agricultural labor would result in national losses of five to 
nine billion dollars annually in the agricultural sector alone.
70
 
The dependence of the United States on unauthorized immigration 
is fueled in part by the fact that the nation has an “unstable agricultural 
labor market that requires constant replenishment with new workers 
from abroad.”
71
 Instability results from the inherent hardship of making 
a living from farm work and, accordingly, the fact that only laborers 
without other options remain in the agricultural industry.
72
 This is not a 
new problem: in 1986, the Committee on Agricultural Workers 
determined that 
the goal of controlling illegal immigration would be best served by 
the development of a more structured and stable domestic 
agricultural labor market with increasingly productive 
workers. . .such a system would . . . address the needs of seasonal 
farmworkers through higher earnings, and the needs of agricultural 
employers through increased productivity and decreased uncertainty 
over labor supply.
73
 
Although the industry comprises only 1 percent of the nation’s 
gross domestic product, agriculture plays a key role in the national 
economy.
74
 Every agricultural job affects three or four others, “from 
people who make and sell fertilizer and farm machinery to those who 
 
Julia Preston, Farmers Oppose G.O.P. Bill on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/politics/31verify.html?pagewanted=all. 
70 News Transcript, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and American Farm 
Bureau Federal (AFBF) Media Conference Call on the Need for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2011/05/0222.xml&contentidon
ly=true. 
71 Testimony of Robert A. Williams, supra note 7; see also Linda Calvin and Philip 
Martin, Labor-Intensive U.S. Fruit and Vegetable Industry Competes in a Global Market, 
AMBER WAVES (Dec. 2010), 
http://webarchives.cdlib.org/sw1vh5dg3r/http://ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/December10/Fea
tures/LaborIntensive.htm.  “The supply of farmworkers for the U.S. produce industry 
depends on a constant influx of new, foreign-born labor attracted by wages above those in 
the workers’ countries of origin.” 
72 Testimony of Robert A. Williams, supra note 7. 
73 Id at 4; (quoting Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers). When it 
enacted IRCA, Congress authorized a Commission on Agricultural Workers to study the 
effects of the act on the agricultural industry and to make recommendations for the future.  
Id. 
74 Stacy McCland, Immigration Reform and Agriculture: What We Really Want, What 
We Really Need, and What Will Happen If They Leave?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 63, 74 (2008). 
CEVASCO NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:30 PM 
2012] NATION OF LAWS, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 189 
work in trucking, food processing, grocery stores, and restaurants.”
75
 
Tamar Jacoby, President of ImmigrationWorks USA, argues that the 
expulsion of unauthorized farm workers would not just mean a small 
increase in prices at the grocery store. Rather, eliminating this labor 
source would cause the collapse of labor-intensive agriculture in the 
United States, thereby forcing the nation to import meat, dairy, fruits, 
and vegetables from other countries.
76
  Without a sufficient number of 
laborers, agricultural production will become the next sector to be 
outsourced.
77
 
A. Immediate Replacement with U.S. Citizens and Work-
Authorized Immigrants 
Agriculture remains dependent on labor performed by 
unauthorized immigrants because of the lack of viable alternatives. 
Proponents of restrictionist state-based enforcement legislation suggest 
that removing undocumented immigrants from the nation’s fields will 
make agricultural jobs available for unemployed U.S. citizens and 
work-authorized immigrants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even 
high unemployment rates are unlikely to push such workers into taking 
and maintaining agricultural jobs.
78
 For those eligible to receive 
unemployment benefits, agricultural work—and the accompanying hard 
 
75 Tamar Jacoby, A Price Tag in the Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/17/could-farms-survive-without-illegal-
labor/without-immigrant-labor-the-economy-would-crumble. 
76 Id. (Expelling unauthorized farm workers from the United States would result in “not 
just more expensive produce, but the collapse of American labor-intensive agriculture. 
Instead of milk from a nearby dairy, the only kind available would come from abroad, and it 
would be irradiated or powdered. Meat would come from Brazil, shellfish from Thailand, 
fruits and vegetables from New Zealand. . .”); accord Calvin and Martin, supra note 71 
(“[s]ome production of labor-intensive crops may shift to countries with lower labor 
costs.”); See also  Forrest Laws, Immigration ‘Reforms’ Could Cost Farmers, Consumers, 
DELTA FARM PRESS, (Oct. 16, 2006, 7:59am), http://deltafarmpress.com/immigration-
reforms-could-cost-farmers-consumers. 
77 United Farmworkers wants YOU. . . to Come take their Jobs?, REFORM IMMIGRATION 
FOR AMERICA, http://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/blog/blog/united-farm-workers-
wants-you%E2%80%A6-to-come-take-their-jobs/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
78 Id.  (“Salinas [California] farm labor contractor Paul Powell had not heard about the 
‘Take Our Jobs’ campaign Wednesday, but said he doubted that most unemployed 
Californians would be up to the challenge. ‘There may be a lot of folks who show up and 
don’t stay for more than a day or two,’ Powell said. ‘They don’t realize how hard the work 
is. Field work is not easy.’”). 
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labor and harsh conditions—is not financially rewarding.
79
  In Alabama, 
unemployed individuals can receive benefits of up to $265 a week, 
while a forty-hour, minimum wage job nets the worker $290.
80
 Location 
also poses a problem: while agricultural jobs are often in rural areas, 
urban areas currently face higher levels of unemployment.
81
 
Furthermore, an insufficient number of U.S. citizens and legal 
workers have adequate training to effectively perform agricultural jobs. 
“Agriculture,” says Demetrius Papademetriuo, founder of the Migration 
Policy Institute, “is a sector and an industry. . .that a long time ago, 
going back to the 1940s and probably before that was abandoned. . .to 
foreign workers.”
82
 Given this exodus, “it is not possible to replace the 
million unauthorized workers who currently work in agriculture with 
legal U.S. workers.”
83
 “The reality is that right now there are simply not 
enough trained and willing American agricultural workers to get these 
jobs done.”
84
 
Comparatively low wages, harsh weather conditions, backbreaking 
physical labor, and the often seasonal nature of such work make 
agricultural jobs unappealing to individuals authorized to work in the 
United States.
85
 The United Farm Workers’ “Take Our Jobs” campaign 
suggests that attempts to hire unemployed U.S. citizens and legal 
immigrants is an impractical way of filling the labor gap created by the 
wholesale removal of undocumented immigrants.
86
 The campaign, a 
 
79 Daily Kos Staff, Kicking out Immigrants Isn’t Working Well for Alabama, DAILY KOS 
(Oct. 27, 2011,12:28 PM PDT), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/27/1030669/-
Kicking-out-immigrants-isn-t-working-well-for-Alabama. 
80 Id. 
81 Jay Reeves and Alicia A. Caldwell, After Alabama Laws, Few Americans Taking 
Immigrants’ Work, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2011 12:58 AM ET), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/21/after-alabama-immigration-law-few-americans-
taking-immigrants-work_n_1023635.html.  
82 Id.  
83 Immigration Update, September 23, 2011, UNITED FARM WORKERS (Sept. 23, 2011),  
http://www.ufw.org/_board.php?mode=view&b_code=ir_news&b_no=11198. 
84 Benjamin Shute, A New Generation of Farmers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/17/could-farms-survive-without-illegal-
labor. “Alabama needs immigrant labor, because too many native-born citizens lack the 
skill, the stamina, and the wiliness to work in the fields- even in a time of steep 
unemployment.” Id.; see also Editorial, It’s What They Asked For; N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/opinion/its-what-they-asked-for.html. 
85 Calvin and Martin, supra note 71. 
86 See generally UNITED FARM WORKERS, http://takeourjobs.org/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2012). 
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particularly graphic depiction of the aversion of many authorized 
workers to farm work, was instituted as a way of encouraging citizens 
and legal residents to replace immigrants in the fields.
87
 The Campaign 
relies on advertisement and recruitment efforts to attract legal workers, 
including encouraging members of Congress to refer unemployed 
constituents to vacant farm worker positions in locations across the 
country.
88
 In the beginning of the summer 2011 season, 8,600 authorized 
workers expressed an interest in becoming agricultural laborers.
89
 By 
September, only seven U.S. citizens involved in the Campaign still held 
agricultural job.
90
 The abject failure of the “Take Our Jobs” campaign 
demonstrates that, even when given the opportunity, U.S. citizens and 
work-authorized aliens are unwilling to take agricultural jobs. 
Georgia’s experience following the passage of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“IIREA”) and the 
concomitant exodus of unauthorized farm laborers is illustrative.
91
 
Governor Nathan Deal proposed replacing the undocumented laborers 
who fled Georgia’s fields in the wake of the IIREA with 2,000 
individuals on probation.
92
 Critics of Governor Deal’s plan expressed 
 
87 Id.; see also McKinley and Preston, supra note 69. An analogous initiative 
established by the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (“the Association”) monitors 
hiring by citrus growers, who by law must offer jobs to authorized workers before 
attempting to hire temporary workers through the H-2A program.  Mike Carlton, director of 
labor relations for the Association, said that of the 344 authorized workers who came 
forward to fill 1,800 pickers’ jobs, only eight were still working at the end of the two-month 
growing season. Id. 
88 Fields of Tears, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17722932. Workers attracted through the ‘Take Our Jobs’ 
campaign “made demands that seem bizarre to farmworkers, such as high pay, health and 
pension benefits, relocation allowances and other things associated with normal American 
jobs.” Id.; see also Aaron Smith, Farm Workers: Take Our Jobs, Please! CNNMONEY (July 
10, 2010, 1:14 PM ET), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/07/news/economy/farm_worker_jobs/index.htm. 
89 Field of Tears, supra note 88. 
90 Id. 
91 Doug Mataconis, Georgia’s New Immigration Law Leading to Crops Rotting in 
Farmers’ Fields, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/georgias-new-immigration-law-leading-to-crops-rotting-
in-farmers-fields/. 
92 News Release, GA. DEP’T OF CORR., Georgia Farms Offer Jobs to Probationers (June 
16, 2011), http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/110616c.html; see also 
Catherine E. Shoichet, Georgia governor: Probationers could fill farm jobs, CNN POLITICS 
(June 14, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-
14/politics/georgia.farm.workers.immigration_1_immigration-law-georgia-governor-labor-
shortages?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
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doubt that probationers, who cannot be forced into specific jobs by state 
corrections officials, would accept the strenuous physical conditions of 
a farm job when unemployment benefits remained available.
93
 Others 
argued that probationers, unversed in the skills necessary to efficiently 
harvest crops, were less efficient pickers and therefore not true 
substitutes for the undocumented migrant workers who declined to 
come to Georgia after the passage of the IIREA.
94
 Furthermore, 
Governor Deal’s plan raises concerns about the relationship between 
labor and meaningful rehabilitation. Carl Wicklund, executive director 
of the American Probation and Parole Association, argues that because 
agricultural positions are largely temporary, “they may not be the best 
way to go for probationers seeking to get back on their feet, avoid 
becoming repeat offenders and find full-time jobs and benefits.”
95
  Thus, 
while novel, the Deal Plan is problematic as a long-term solution to 
agricultural labor shortages. 
If individual states are to take on the mantle of domestic 
immigration regulation, legislators must seriously consider the labor 
needs of the agricultural sector of the economy. Plans for attracting 
replacement agricultural workers cannot be an afterthought, as they 
were in Alabama, where talks about a replacement source of labor were 
not made until after the passage of the restrictive ATCPA and resultant 
mass exodus of laborers.
96
 Labor provided by undocumented immigrants 
is a critical thread in the national agricultural tapestry. Reform efforts 
that ignore this basic fact threaten to undermine the industry’s vitality. 
 
93 Georgia Scours Probation Rolls For Farm Labor; D.C. Begins To Look At Federal 
Solutions, PEACHPUNDIT.COM (June 15, 2011, 17:00 PM), 
http://www.peachpundit.com/2011/06/15/georgia-scours-probation-rolls-for-farm-labor-d-c-
begins-to-look-at-federal-solutions/. 
94 Editorial, Probation Workers Not Keeping Pace Down on the Farm, THE NEWNAN 
TIMES- HERALD (June 23, 2011), http://www.times-herald.com/opinion/Probation-
workers——not-keeping-pace—-down-on-the-farms—-1723999. 
95 Margaret Newkirk, Ga. Criminals Sub for Immigrant Farm Workers, BLOOMBERG 
(June 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-15/georgia-criminals-sub-for-
immigrant-farm-workers.html; see also  Jeremy Redmon, State survey: 11,080 farm jobs 
unfilled: Governor suggest putting people on criminal probation to work, THE ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (June 15, 2011), 
 http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/state-survey-11080-farm-jobs-
unfilled/nQwPH/. 
96 Martin Swant, Alabama Farmers Doubt Proposals for Help with Labor Shortage 
From Immigration Law, AL.COM (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://blog.al.com/businessnews/2011/10/alabama_farmers_doubt_proposal.html. 
CEVASCO NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:30 PM 
2012] NATION OF LAWS, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 193 
B. The Guest Worker Program 
i. Structural Problems 
The current guest worker program is poorly suited to recruit an 
adequate number of agricultural laborers. The guest worker program 
fails to accommodate the exigencies of agricultural labor, where 
workers often show up the day a job starts, work until the job is done, 
and then move on. In contrast, farmers who want to hire guest workers 
must file an application for a temporary labor certification at least forty-
five days before the date that the laborer will start work.
97
 This 
requirement is burdensome for farmers, who are hard-pressed to 
determine the exact amount of labor necessary at a given point or in a 
given year because of inconsistencies in crop yields and harvest times.
98
 
Guest-worker programs are simply too stiff to fit with the dynamic 
U.S. market. . . [o]ur strength is that our economy is fluid. . . [i]f we 
need labor all of a sudden in New Orleans, the workers just show up. 
Once you rely on a guest-worker program, you have a huge amount 
of reliance on government bureaucracy.
99
 
The program permits workers to be hired on a temporary basis 
only. This makes it entirely impractical for subsections of the 
agricultural sector that require a skilled workforce all year long, such as 
the dairy, livestock, poultry, and ginning industries,  to rely on the guest 
worker program as a source of labor.
100
 Regularly taking time to train 
new employees, and then waiting while their skills reach the level of 
more experienced workers threatens to harm productivity.
101
  
 
97 See 20 C.F.R. 655.130(b) (2012). 
98 Jeremy Redmon and Daniel Malloy, Report: Farm Labor Shortages May Cost 
Georgia Economy $391 Million, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/report-farm-labor-shortages-
1194039.html. Georgia state representative Matt Ramsey stated that, while “‘existing 
federal visa programs. . . provide a legal avenue for the agriculture industry to import as 
much migrant labor as necessary to supplement their domestic workforce’ those programs 
are ‘bureaucratically and administratively cumbersome’ and in need of improvement.” Id. 
99 Nathan Thornburgh-Vass, Can a Guest Worker Program Work?, TIME (May 24, 
2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1625191,00.html. 
100 Georgia Recruiting Ag States to Help Improve Guest Worker Program, 
MSBUSINESS.COM (Feb. 6, 2012), http://msbusiness.com/businessblog/2012/02/06/georgia-
urges-other-ag-states-to-help-get-workable-guest-worker-program/; see also NPR Staff, E-
Verify Rattles Nerves in America’s Dairyland, NPR.ORG (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/31/140086117/e-verify-rattles-nerves-in-americas-dairyland. 
101 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren of California stating 
CEVASCO NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:30 PM 
194 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
Furthermore, the program is prohibitively expensive, especially for 
small farmers. In addition to paying wages, farmers are required to 
provide free housing for workers who cannot reasonably be expected to 
return home each night and to pay travel costs to and from the worker’s 
home country.
102
 The program’s effectiveness is further undermined by 
popular perceptions: hiring unauthorized workers is simply easier than 
working through a “labyrinthine. . . process,” described as “too 
expensive . . . too litigious . . . [and] too bureaucratic.”
103
 
Statistics provide a striking indictment of the program: today, 
IRCA’s H-2a program accounts for only about 3 percent total 
agricultural workforce. 
104
  The current program does not recognize 
“current workforce demographics,” as it makes only 200,000 visas 
available annually.
105
  In contrast, undocumented workers fill roughly six 
million jobs in the United States, “many of which are in the agricultural 
and service sectors no longer being filled by native-born workers.”
106
  
The present guest worker program is thus an inappropriate vehicle for 
solving the labor shortage sparked by restrictionist state-based 
immigration policies. 
 
 
“please don’t tell me the solution is the H2A reform. Don’t tell me that the solution to this 
problem is to deport 1.5 million experienced farm workers who are already doing this 
important work just to replace them with millions of new temporary guest workers which 
would have to come and go every single year. This would be a massive and terribly 
expensive undertaking and is simply just never going to work.”). 
102 20 C.F.R. 655.122(d) (2012).  
103 Alicia A. Caldwill, Ag Industry Faces Labor Woes in Immigration Debate, 
CBSNEWS.COM (June 4, 2011),  http://cbsnews.com/news/article/ag-industry-faces-labor-
woes-immigration-debate; see also Written Testimony of Bruce Goldstein, House Judiciary 
Comm., Subcomm. On Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th Cong. (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Goldstein04132011.pdf (Bruce Goldstein is the 
President of Farmworker Justice.). 
104 The H-2A Temporary Agricultural Guestworker Program, FARMWORKER JUSTICE 
(2012) (the program provides approximately “80,000 of an estimated 2-2.5 million 
agricultural workers” each year); see also Immigration: A Better Farm Worker Fix, L.A. 
TIMES (May 9, 2011), http://farmworkersforum.wordpress.com/2011/05/09/immigration-a-
better-farm-worker-fix/ (“[T]he H-2A program provides only about 3% of the total 
agricultural workforce, according to Western Growers, a trade association that represents 
farmers in California and Arizona.”). 
105 Immigration: A Better Farmworker Fix, supra note 104. 
106 Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Can’t Live with ‘Em, Can’t Deport ‘Em: Why Recent 
Immigration Reform Efforts Have Failed, NEXUS, 13 NEXUS 13, 21 (2008). 
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ii. Human Rights Abuses 
The H-2A program faces criticism for human rights abuses so 
endemic that the Southern Poverty Law Center has analogized it to 
slavery.
107
 While Congress has afforded human rights protections to 
migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, such protections have not 
been extended to guest workers.
108
 Guest workers are highly vulnerable 
to abuse because each worker’s immigration status is tied to his or her 
employer. Because reporting abuses could result in the guest worker 
being sent home, the “balance of power between employer and worker 
is skewed so disproportionately in favor of the employer that, for all 
practical purposes, the worker’s rights are nullified.”
109
  Workers are 
further discouraged from reporting exploitative conditions by the threat 
of blacklisting, in which a complaining worker’s name is placed on a 
list to ensure that he or she will not be rehired in the future.
110
 Fear of 
retaliation is a deeply-rooted problem and a major contributor to 
systemic human rights abuses.
111
 Together with the practical difficulties 
of expanding the guest worker to a national scale and devising a flexible 
system that accounts for the exigencies of agriculture, the human rights 
abuses endemic in the current guest worker system suggest that the 
program must be completely overhauled before policy makers should 
consider it a true alternative to the agricultural industry’s reliance on 
undocumented laborers. 
 
 
 
107 Mary Bauer, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States, THE 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1 (2007), 
http://www.gpn.org/splcenter.org.SPLCguestworker.pdf. 
108 The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(b) 
(1983); see also Goldstein, supra note 103 (“Further compounding this vulnerability, many 
guest workers arrive deeply in debt, having paid enormous recruiters’ fees for the 
opportunity to work in the United States, often under very misleading descriptions. 
Depending on their country of origin, workers pay anywhere from hundreds to thousands of 
dollars.  In addition, workers are sometimes required to leave collateral, such as a property 
deed, with recruiters to ensure that workers will complete their contract.”). 
109 Bauer, supra note 107, at 15. 
110 Id.  at 16.  The North Carolina Growers Association blacklist is an example of one 
such list that has been widely publicized. The “1997 NCGA Ineligible for Rehire Report” 
consisted of more than 1,000 names of undesirable former guest-workers.  Id. 
111 Id. at 17. 
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C. Mechanization 
To date, mechanization is an impractical substitute for human 
agricultural labor. Even where technology can be effectively employed, 
human judgment and dexterity are necessary to ensure a complete 
harvest and thus maximum profits.
112
 “A machine cannot easily mimic 
the judgment and dexterity of experienced farmworkers, particularly 
when crops do not mature evenly, and workers must determine what can 
be harvested during multiple passes through fields and orchards.”
113
 
Individual crops present specific challenges: strawberries, for example, 
can only be harvested by hand, as commercial mechanical harvesters are 
not currently available.
114
 Although oranges for processing can be 
harvested mechanically, the necessary machinery costs over a million 
dollars, a sum that is prohibitive for small farmers.
115
 Like strawberries, 
oranges for the fresh market must be harvested by hand because 
mechanical harvesters damage the fruit’s skin and make it 
unmarketable.
116
 It seems unlikely that mechanical harvesters will soon 
be able to replace unauthorized laborer’s in the nation’s fields, as 
developing such a system “often depends on breakthroughs in three 
areas: machinery, varieties, and agricultural practices.”
117
 Mechanization 
therefore cannot be instantly adopted as a substitute for the millions of 
undocumented laborers who currently toil in the nation’s fields. 
III. STATE LEGISLATURES AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 
In the nation’s early years, states stepped forward to fill a void 
unregulated by the federal government; today, state legislation aims to 
enforce laws created by a federal government that hesitates to 
effectively enforce them. Lawmakers’ frustration with the federal 
government’s inability to revamp immigration policies is evident from 
the marked increase in sub-federal immigration legislation from 2007 
 
112 Megan McArdle, Illegal Immigrants Might Be Undocumented, But They’re Not 
Unskilled, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/07/illegal-immgrants-might-be-
undocumented-but-theyre-not-unskilled/241510/. 
113 Calvin and Martin, supra note 71 at 29. 
114 Id at 28. 
115 Id at 30.  
116 Id at 26. 
117 Id at 29. 
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onward.
118
 Today, “immigration is one of the most pressing issues facing 
state legislatures, and state policy makers have received little to no help 
from the federal government” in crafting better immigration control 
policies.
119
 
Such legislation is arguably motivated by security and economic 
concerns.
120
 Violence, drug cartels, and human smuggling are of 
particular concern for states on the southern border; security concerns 
are cited as a reason for stringent state-based immigration 
enforcement.
121
 In an interview with the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer complained of the 
education, healthcare, and incarceration costs imposed on the state by 
undocumented immigrants, concluding that the state could not afford 
such a burden.
122
  Brewer argues that “Arizona has been more than 
patient waiting for Washington to secure the border. . .[d]ecades of 
federal inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and 
unacceptable situation.”
123
 
 
118 Ryan Terrance Chin, Moving Toward Subfederal Involvement in Federal 
Immigration Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1861 (2011). 
119 National Conference of State Legislatures, States Continue to Step up to the Plate on 
Immigration Issues, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/press-room/states-continue-to-step-up-to-the-plate-on-immigra.aspx. 
120 Interview by Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures with Rich Crandall, State 
Senator, Az., in San Antonio, Tex. (Aug. 8-11, 2011), available at  
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23572; see also Julia Preston, Immigration 
Decreases, but Tensions Remain High, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/us/illegal-migration-from-mexico-falls-but-local-fears-
persist.html?_r=1&hp. (statement by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer that “[f]or years, 
Washington has stood idly by, letting our borders grow more porous and more dangerous.” 
While the overall number of undocumented immigrants crossing the United States-Mexico 
border decreased in 2011, “federal and local officials said they now faced smaller numbers 
of more determined and potentially more dangerous crossers, including migrants carrying 
illegal drugs.”). 
121 Interview by Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures with Leticia Van de Putte, State 
Senator, Tex., in San Antonio, Tex. (Aug. 8-11, 2011), available at  
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23572; see also Nicholas Riccardi, Arizona Passes 
Strict Illegal Immigration Act, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2010), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/13/nation/la-na-arizona-immigration14-2010apr14. 
122 Jeanette Torres, Supreme Court Set to Hear Challenge to Arizona’s 
Immigration Law, ABC NEWS RADIO  (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://abcnewsradioonline.com/national-news/supreme-court-set-to-hear-challenge-to-
arizonas-immigration.html. 
123 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Arizona’s Immigration Law, 
WASH. POST. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-
hear-challenge-of-arizonas-restrictive-immigration-
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State officials also cite fiscal concerns as evidence of the need for 
more stringent immigration laws. Although undocumented immigrants 
pay income, payroll, and sales taxes—thereby contributing to local, 
state, and federal governments—some policy makers argue that such 
individuals create a fiscal burden borne by individual states.
124
 While 
some experts suggest that undocumented immigrants have a small net 
impact on the U.S. economy, advocates of state-based immigration 
enforcement tout the economic difficulties purportedly created by 
undocumented immigrants as a driving force behind such legislation.
125
  
State Representative Mike Ball of Alabama contends that there is a 
connection between the state’s high unemployment rate and the high 
number of undocumented immigrants residing there.  Representative 
Ball believes that that aggressive immigration legislation will “level the 
playing field” between ‘undereducated,’ unemployed Alabamans and 
undocumented immigrants, who do not “have to pay workman’s comp 
insurance” or “employee tax.”
126
 Ball asserts that tough immigration 
laws are the answer to Alabama’s “huge poverty problem” and high rate 
of unemployment, as such measures will create jobs for U.S. citizens 
and authorized aliens.
127
 
While Arizona’s efforts to regulate immigration have captured 
national and international headlines, copycat laws passed in Georgia 
and Alabama are arguably the harshest to date and serve to crystallize 
the symbiotic relationship between agriculture, undocumented workers, 
and state law. Agriculture is the largest industry in both of those states, 
netting annual profits of slightly over five billion dollars in Georgia and 
 
law/2011/12/12/gIQA4UYepO_story.html. 
124 Gordon H. Hanson, “The Economics and Policy of Illegal Immigration in the United 
States.” MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, 10 (Dec. 2009),  
http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/037/11124.pdf; Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: 
What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 
460-61 (2008).  Kobach argues that although the fiscal burden at the federal level is 
significant—more than $10 billion annually—the lion’s share hits state budgets. Id. 
125 Hanson, supra note 124, at 1; Arian Campo-Flores, Alabama Gets Tough on Illegal 
Immigrants, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304392704576375540410159236.html. 
Alabama State Representative Micky Hammon stated that “[e]veryone’s in a financial bind 
right now,” and undocumented immigrants are “taking a toll on our state revenue.” Id. 
126 Alabama’s Immigration Law: Assessing the Economic, Social Impact, PBS 
NEWSHOUR, (Public Broadcasting Service Oct.13, 2011), available at  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec11/alimmigration_10-13.html. 
127 Id. 
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slightly under five billion dollars in Alabama.
128
 
Georgia enacted the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement 
Act” (“IIREA”) in April of 2011. The law requires public and private 
employers with more than ten employees to use the federal employment 
eligibility verification system, provides law enforcement officials with 
the authority to enforce federal immigration laws, and allows law 
enforcement officials to question criminal suspects about their 
immigration status.
129
 
The situation in Alabama is strikingly similar. Passed in April of 
2011, the Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (“ATCPA”) 
maintains that “illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and 
lawlessness in this state.”
130
 The ATCPA prohibits employers who seek 
any incentive or benefit from the state from hiring undocumented 
workers and mandates the use of E-Verify.
131
 The act further prohibits 
property owners from renting to undocumented immigrants, requires 
school districts to verify the immigration status of enrolled students, and 
criminalizes behavior relating to “[c]oncealing, harboring, [or] shielding 
unauthorized aliens.”
132
 
IV: AGRICULTURE AS THE ACHILLES HEEL OF STATE-
BASED ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION 
Because agriculture is a critical industry in Georgia and Alabama, 
events in those states following the passage of state-based immigration 
regulation illustrate the calamitous relationship between such legislation 
and the agricultural industry’s dependence on undocumented workers. 
 
 
128 Newkirk, supra, note 95. (“Farming is a $5.1 billion industry in Georgia, according 
to its Agriculture Department.”); Ga. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 92; Daniel Robinson, 
“Welcome,” U.S.  DEP’T. OF AG. FARM SERVICES AGENCY (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/stateoffapp?mystate=al&area=home&subject=landing&topic
=landing. 
129 GA. CODE ANN., § 36-60-6(a) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN., § 36-60-6(j) (West 
2011). 
130 ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (West 2011). 
131 ALA. CODE § 31-13-9 (West 2011). 
132 ALA. CODE § 31-13-13 (West 2011). In August of 2012, the 11th Circuit determined 
that this provision of the ATCPA was conflict preempted by federal immigration law, as it 
undermined Congress’ intent to allow the Executive Branch discretion in immigration 
matters. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court’s 
decision does little to staunch the anti-immigrant motive and effect of the now-defunct 
provisions.  
CEVASCO NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:30 PM 
200 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
In Georgia, 46 percent of the state’s farmers reported a labor 
shortage after the passage of the IIREA, sparking a ripple effect that 
resulted in a $106.5 million loss in other goods and services.
133
 
According to a state survey, over 11,000 agricultural jobs went unfilled 
during the summer 2011 growing season.
134
 Without legislative action, 
the shortage is likely to continue, resulting in an estimated $300 million 
in losses to the state’s agricultural sector as a whole.
135
 
Public reaction to the ATCPA was swift and strong in Alabama’s 
immigrant communities. State Senator Bill Beasley stated that the law 
amounted to telling “Hispanics [that] we don’t want you in Alabama.”
136
 
In the aftermath of the enactment of the law, “many frightened 
Hispanics [hid] in their homes or fled” the state.
137
 Agriculture 
Commissioner John McMillan admitted that the law had “unintended 
consequences,” and that “workers began leaving the state 
immediately.”
138
 The exodus of immigrant workers, both documented 
and undocumented, meant that crops like blueberries, tomatoes, and 
squash that can only harvested by hand were left “rotting in the 
fields.”
139
 The Alabama Farmers Federation estimates that the 
immigration law will have a $63 million impact on agriculture.
140
 
Commissioner McMillan expressed doubt that the law’s effects would 
be limited to a single growing season, and advised farmers not to plant 
 
133 Campo-Flores, supra note 125; Redmon and Malloy, supra note 98. 
134 Ga. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 92. This figure represents roughly 14 percent of the 
agricultural jobs filled annually in the state. Id.; see also Redmon and Malloy, supra note 
98. The state’s economy will lose a projected 3,260 more jobs as a result of labor shortages 
in the agricultural sector. Id. 
135 Redmon and Malloy, supra note 98; see also Mary Bauer, Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Must Be Priority for Nation, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (July 
29, 2011), 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/immigration-reform-is-an-economic-issue. 
136 Ctr. for Am. Progress Immigration Team, Not-So-Sweet Home Alabama 
What People Are Saying About the State’s New Immigration Law, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/10/alabama_law_quotes.html. 
137 Jay Reeves, Alabama Hispanics Halt Work to Protest Tough, New Immigration Law, 
MSNBC.COM (Oct. 12, 2011, 4:06 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44879612/ns/us_news-life/t/alabama-hispanics-halt-work-
protest-tough-new-immigration-law/#.Txxom6Wud-c. 
138 Challen Stephens, Alabama Farmers Losing Immigrant Labor, See Produce Rotting 
in the Fields, AL.COM (Sept. 26, 2011, 4:05 PM), 
http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/09/alabama_farmers_losing_immigra.html. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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labor-intensive crops next year.
141
 
Experiences in Georgia and Alabama illustrate the agricultural 
industry’s reliance on undocumented workers, and suggest that state-
based attempts to reform national immigration policy by enacting anti-
immigrant legislation could prove disastrous to the agricultural industry. 
At present, the undocumented individuals that work the nation’s fields 
are not simply a source of cheap labor—as suggested by the failure of 
the “Take Our Jobs” campaign and the problems inherent in the guest 
worker program, such laborers are the only readily available source. 
Among the industries that rely on undocumented laborers, agriculture is 
unique because of the high percentage of undocumented workers that 
comprise the total workforce and the lack of viable alternatives.  It is 
clear that “[l]osing those workers would be devastating” to the 
agricultural industry: “American farms would go under, America would 
be less secure, and we would see a mass offshoring of jobs, including all 
of the upstream and downstream American jobs supported by 
agriculture.”
142
 Necessary reforms to the present immigration system 
must recognize the centrality of undocumented workers to the 
agricultural sector of the U.S. economy and ensure that the human rights 
of those individuals are protected. 
Enforcement-only measures enacted on a state-by-state basis are a 
troubling method of attempting to restore the rule of law to the reality of 
contemporary migration to the United States. Such measures threaten to 
destroy the present ability of agricultural workers to migrate from state 
to state as work ebbs and flows in different places. Take, for example, 
the disparate treatment of undocumented workers imposed by 
California, Arizona, and Utah. In 2011, California enacted the 
Employment Acceleration Act, which prohibited state and local 
governments from requiring employers to use E-Verify.
143
 In contrast, 
the Legal Arizona Workers Act mandates that all employers use the E-
Verify system, and encourages citizens to report violations of the 
prohibition on hiring undocumented workers.
144
 Utah adopted a 
 
141 Id. 
142 Immigration Policy and Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., supra note 101. 
143 Bernice Yueng, State Poised to Restrict use of E-Verify Database, CALIFORNIA 
WATCH (Sept. 16, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/state-poised-restrict-use-e-
verify-database-12631. 
144 Att’y Gen. of Ariz., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about the Arizona Legal 
Workers Act, http://www.azag.gov/LegalAZWorkersAct/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). 
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legislative package that, like California, recognizes the importance of 
undocumented workers to the state’s economy. While Utah seeks to 
enforce the federal prohibition on hiring undocumented workers, it 
provides an alternative source of labor by creating a guest worker 
program operated at the state level.
145
 Thus, after the enactment of 
immigration legislation in Arizona and Utah, an undocumented laborer 
willing to harvest avocados in California, apples in Utah, and 
cantaloupe in Arizona, would be able to work in California, required to 
obtain a special permit to work in Utah, and unable to work in 
Arizona.
146
 Immigration policies that vary from state to state threaten to 
create a glut of workers in some states and a dearth in others, despite the 
fact that the need for workers may be identical. 
Sustainable agriculture requires a sustainable immigration policy. 
In the long-term, policy makers must consider an overhaul of the system 
used to admit workers and others into the country. IRCA’s failure 
suggests that unworkable visa programs created a cycle of rampant 
disregard for the immigration system and the ultimate entrenchment of 
individuals who have entered the country in violation of the law. 
Instead, the federal government should endeavor to put in place a visa 
system which takes into account the agricultural sector’s need for 
immigrant laborers, and, in recognition of that need, endeavors to 
compensate those individuals for their service by affording them legal 
status, stability, and protection from overreaching employers. 
Attempts to maintain a subclass of agricultural workers or some 
temporary form of visa tying laborers to farm work in general or to 
specific farmers must be dissuaded. While Utah’s innovative guest 
worker program is attractive because it serves both the interests of 
 
145 Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-12-201 (West 
2011). The Utah act includes a state-based guest worker program. Individuals who currently 
live in Utah, are over the age of eighteen, or have the permission of a parent or guardian if 
younger than eighteen, and provide documentation of a contract for hire are eligible to apply 
for a guest worker permit. Utah Code Ann § 63G-12-205. Workers who entered the United 
States without inspection must pay a fee of $2,500; those who entered the United States 
legally but have since fallen out of status are required to pay $1,000.  Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-12-207. Members of the guest worker’s immediate family currently residing in Utah 
are eligible to apply for an immediate family permit. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-12-206. The 
law also mandates that guest workers “in good faith use best efforts to become proficient in 
the English language.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-12-209. 
146 Noah Bond, Utah Bill Would Punish Businesses Who Hire Undocumented Workers, 
ABC4.COM (May 27, 2011), http://www.abc4.com/content/news/state/story/Utah-bill-would-
punish-businesses-who-hire/M6Xc8ac5-ki_E7z_VET_Wg.cspx. 
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farmers and agricultural workers by allowing present laborers to 
continue working, analogous state-based efforts should at best be 
considered a stop-gap measure in the absence of comprehensive 
immigration reform, and not a true solution to the immigration 
quagmire.
147
 The ‘Utah solution’ is not a long-term solution to current 
conflict between immigration law and the nation’s reliance on 
undocumented agricultural workers. Like the troubled federal H-2a 
program, Utah’s program provides workers with temporary status that is 
tied to the employer, thereby prompting human rights abuses like those 
described above.
148
 The Utah program provides legal status only for 
individuals living or working in the state prior to May 10, 2011.
149
 If 
successful, this program will thereby ensure an adequate number of 
laborers in the short term.
150
 However, it makes no provision for what 
will happen should the number of workers who fit that criteria suddenly 
shrink.
151
  Furthermore, Utah’s two-year work permit is temporary in 
nature, thus furthering the instability already endemic in the agricultural 
 
147 Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, § 63G-12-201 (West 2011). On its face, 
the Utah program appears attentive to worker’s rights as members of a worker’s immediate 
family are also granted temporary legal status, and employers must provide basic health 
insurance coverage. 
148 § 63G-12-205 (West 2011). 
149 Id. 
150 On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced a federal short-term 
alternative to comprehensive immigration reform: the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals 
(“DACA”) program. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a memoranda 
to the USCIS and USCPB directing that prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in 
favor of young immigrants under the age of 31 who arrived in the U.S. before the age of 16 
and submit an application demonstrating residency, education, and conduct requirements 
beginning on August 15, 2012.  Memoranda for David V. Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion for Individuals 
who Came to the United States as Children, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (June 
15, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people.pdf. 
While the effects of this policy remain to be seen, DACA’s chief accomplishment is 
offering temporary status and work permits to qualifying individuals.  DACA does not offer 
a path to residency or citizenship, and it is unclear what status individuals who receive such 
status will be afforded at the end of the two year period during which prosecutorial 
discretion will be recognized.  Alejandro Mayorkas, Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals: Who Can Be Considered? THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012 11:55 AM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/15/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-who-can-
be-considered.  Like the Utah Plan, DACA is perhaps no more than a Band-Aid on the 
gaping wound that is U.S. immigration policy in the twenty-first century. While innovative 
temporary solutions to Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform, both 
programs regrettably fail to afford such individuals full rights or a path to permanent legal 
status and to address wider policy concerns. 
151 § 63G-12-205 (West 2011). 
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sector.
152
 
Resolving the conflict between immigration law and reality 
requires recognition of the fact that individuals who lack legal status 
play a crucial role in the agricultural sector of the U.S. economy. 
Following this basic recognition, the federal government must 
determine how best to handle this large group of people. Given the 
hardships involved in obtaining substitute farmworkers, wholesale 
removal of such individuals from the nation’s fields is impractical. The 
importance of agricultural workers to the national economy necessitates 
that the federal government take steps to afford these individuals some 
form of legal status that will simultaneously enable them to continue 
working and offer protection for basic human rights. 
State-based efforts to encourage undocumented immigrants to self-
deport threaten to create labor shortages that will prove ruinous to the 
agricultural sector of the United States economy. In the short term, the 
federal government must implement an amnesty program, akin to the 
special agricultural worker program created by IRCA in 1986, to 
compensate long-time agricultural workers for their service by affording 
them legal status.
153
 Such a program would prevent a labor interruption, 
as the individuals already present in the United States who possess the 
necessary skill set and are accustomed to the demands of agricultural 
work would be permitted to remain.  In return for retaining a sufficient 
labor force, agricultural employers should be subject to strict federal 
oversight to ensure that they adhere to labor standards. 
It is undisputed that passing comprehensive immigration reform 
will require a complex political tango marked by cooperation on both 
sides of the aisle. In enacting legislation for the benefit of present 
agricultural workers, conservative elements of Congress could be 
placated by placing restrictions on the program requiring that workers 
pay a fine as retribution for skirting the immigration laws and, perhaps, 
requiring that applicants undertake best efforts to learn English and 
 
152 Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-12-207.  The 
Utah program allows for renewal of a work permit, provided that the applicant demonstrates 
“best efforts to become proficient in” English. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-12-209. 
153 See Motomura, supra note 34 at 8 (arguing that “[t]olerance of a substantial 
undocumented population may even be a rational admissions scheme. Inviting immigrants 
outside the law and then periodically legalizing those with strong work histories—an 
approach that relies heavily on a flexible notion of unlawful presence—may be more 
accurate and efficient than trying to identify ex ante who the best economic contributors will 
be.”).  
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civics, akin to that currently imposed on applicants for naturalization. 
Laborers who chose to pay the fine and who met residency, work, and 
civics requirements should be afforded legal permanent residency. 
Affording now-undocumented farm workers full membership in U.S. 
society would simultaneously ensure the existence of an adequate 
workforce in the immediate future and that the labor rights of such 
individuals are protected. 
Perhaps most critically, the United States must reconsider its 
attitude towards undocumented farmworkers. Recent experiences in 
Georgia and Alabama prove that when these laborers decide not to show 
up for work, crops rot in the fields. U.S. policy must reflect the fact that 
notions of immigration laborers as “disposable” and “easily sent home” 
when not immediately needed are antiquated and must be abandoned.
154
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Anti-immigrant legislation that seeks to push undocumented 
immigrants across state and national borders threatens to create a labor 
shortage that could cripple the nation’s agricultural industry. 
“[R]estrictive immigration policies threaten the viability of agricultural 
subsectors that remain heavily dependent on farm labor, especially fruit, 
tree nuts, vegetables, and horticulture.”
155
 The mere threat of such 
legislation was enough to intimidate laborers from showing up at cotton 
ginning time in Oklahoma; in Georgia, even before the IIREA was 
signed into law, workers concerned about coming to the state went 
elsewhere and were absent at harvest time.
156
  Experience has shown that 
United States citizens and work-authorized immigrants are unwilling to 
take agricultural jobs, that complete mechanization of the agricultural 
industry is untenable, and that the current guest worker program is ill 
 
154 Id. at 7. 
155 William Kandel, Hired Farmworkers a Major Input For Some U.S. Farm Sectors, 
AMBER WAVES (Apr. 2008), 
http://webarchives.cdlib.org/sw1vh5dg3r/http://ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/April08/Features
/HiredFarm.htm. 
156 Associated Press, Anti-illegal Immigration Law Affecting Agricultural Sector, TULSA 
WORLD (Nov. 4, 2007), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectID=12&articleID=071104_1__LAWT
O37824; NPR Staff, Cost Of Georgia’s Immigration Laws Passed To Farms, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (July 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/02/137572612/cost-of-georgias-
immigration-laws-passed-to-farms. 
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suited to provide a sufficient number of laborers.  Accordingly, at 
present, there is no alternative source of agricultural labor to replace the 
undocumented immigrants who work the nation’s fields and no 
alternative method for continuing agricultural production in the absence 
of such individuals. 
Restrictionist immigration laws that seek to compel self-
deportation, characterized by rhetoric eerily reminiscent of the “nativist 
agitation” that propelled U.S. immigration policy in the early twentieth 
century, are a troubling method of resolving the conflict between our 
immigration law and the reality of large-scale migration outside the 
law.
157
 Such legislation fails to recognize the fact that, at present, the 
undocumented workers who work the nation’s fields are the only 
available source of willing, skilled agricultural labor. The rapid, 
wholesale removal of such individuals without provision for their 
replacement will trigger a domino effect of economic consequences, 
thereby threatening the future of agriculture in the United States. State-
based immigration legislation is not the future of U.S. immigration 
policy—rather, such efforts should be seen as a plea for the federal 
government’s attention to the complex reality of immigration policy and 
the enactment of comprehensive immigration reform on the national 
level.
158
 
 
 
 
157 ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL 
STATE 278 (1994). 
158 Less than a year after enacting one of the nation’s harshest immigration restriction 
laws, Georgia began to encourage other states to push Congress to modernize and improve 
the guest worker program.  See Georgia Recruiting Ag States to Help Improve Guest 
Worker Program, MSBUSINESS.COM, (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://msbusiness.com/businessblog/2012/02/06/georgia-urges-other-ag-states-to-help-get-
workable-guest-worker-program/. 
